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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-ALIMONY MAY BE
AWARDED WIFE AFTER HUSBAND OBTAINS EX PARTE
DIVORCE
Plaintiff brought suit for divorce and alimony in Ohio. Her husband
set up as a defense an ex parte divorce previously obtained by him in
Florida. The Ohio court dismissed the action for divorce, but granted
the wife alimony. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding that
the prior divorce decree was not a bar to plaintiff's right to alimony.'
On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed.
As the Florida court did not adjudicate the issue of alimony, the divorce decree granted to defendant is not a bar to the wife's subsequent
recovery of alimony in Ohio. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568
(1956).
There is conflicting authority in the states as to whether the wife's
right to support from her husband survives divorce. Some jurisdictions
hold that the right to alimony is derived from the marital status and
2
that this right ceases to exist upon the termination of the status.
Other jurisdictions, following the divisible divorce doctrine, hold the
marital status and the right to alimony to be severable and that the
wife may obtain alimony after the marital status has been terminated.3
It is well settled that a valid ex parte divorce obtained in a state
wherein one of the parties is legally domiciled must be given full faith
and credit by all other states insofar as it relates to the marital status
of the parties. 4 Suppose, however, the husband obtains a valid ex parte
divorce in state X which follows the rule that divorce ends the right
to alimony; or suppose state X follows the divisible divorce rule but
the court, after deliberation, denies the absent wife alimony. Later the
1. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954).
2. Ives v. Ives, 247 Ala. 689, 26 So. 2d 92 (1946); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 70
Cal. App. 2d 233, 160 P.2d 923 (1945); Anglin v. Anglin, 211 Miss. 405, 51 So.

2d 781 (1951); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 198 Okla. 370, 178 P.2d 874 (1947). Some courts

deny alimony after divorce on the theory that the statute gives them power
to award alimony to a wife, and after divorce the plaintiff is no longer a wife.
Peff v. Peff, 2 N.J. SB, 67 A.2d 161 (1949); Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 114 A.2d

518 (1955).

For other cases on point, see Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1402-12

(1953).
3. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 82 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1955); Taylor v. Taylor, 242
S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1951); O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 6 N.J. 170, 78 A.2d 64
(1951); Melnyk v. Melnyk, 107 N.E.2d 549 (Ohio 1952); Slapp v. Slapp, 73
Ohio App. 444, 57 N.E.2d 81 (1943); Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 24 N.W.2d
327 (1946); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.W. 977 (1910). On divisible divorce in general, see Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1287
(1951).
4. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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wife sues for alimony in state Y which follows the divisible divorce
doctrine. In either situation the question arises as to whether or not
the prior divorce decree must be given full faith and credit 5 by state Y
so as to preclude a subsequent recovery of alimony by the wife.6 In
Estin v. Estin,7 the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of divisible
divorce and held that a Nevada court in an ex parte proceeding by the
husband did not have the power to cut off rights arising under a prior
maintenance judgment awarded the wife in New York. It was held that
the maintenance judgment created an intangible property interest
which under the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff 8 could be extinguished only
by a court having personal jurisdiction over the wife. As the Nevada
court lacked personal jurisdiction of the wife the divorce decree was
not entitled to full faith and credit insofar as it purported to adjudicate
the wife's rights under the prior judgment. 9 This rule has been extended by some courts to instances in which there was no prior judgment for support or alimony. 10 These courts have held that the wife's
right to support, even though not reduced to judgment, is such an
intangible property right as to fall within the rule of the Pennoyer
case. 1
In the instant case a majority of the justices interpreted the opinion
5. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. A judgment rendered in one state is to have the
same effect in all other states as it does in the state rendered. Chicago & A.R.R.
v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887).
6. There is some language of the Supreme Court to the effect that state Y
must give such a prior decree full faith and credit. ". . . since the Courts of
Virginia hold upon general principles that alimony has its origin in the legal

obligation of the husband to maintain his wife ... it is plain that such a decree
forecloses any right of the wife to have alimony or equivalent maintenance
from her husband under the law of Virginia.

"From this it results that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

correctly held that the Virginia decree barred the wife's action for maintenance
in the courts of this District." Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551, 556-57
(1913). However, the significance of this case is questionable-at this time

it was not clear that any part of a foreign divorce decree had to be given full
faith and credit. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1905).
7. 334 U.S. 541 (1948). This case was followed in Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334
U.S. 555 (1948). See also Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 281 (1945)
(concurring opinion).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).

9. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)

(where a court lacks personal

jurisdiction over a parent, its decree cutting off that parent's right to custody

of minor children need not be given full faith and credit).

10. Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Meredith v. Meredith,

204 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Taylor v. Taylor, 242 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1951);

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 App. Div. 2d 3, 147 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't 1954),
affd, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553 (1956).
11. While some courts purported to limit the Estin case to its facts, the cases

arose in jurisdictions which did not recognize alimony rights after the parties

were divorced. Anglin v. Anglin, 211 Miss. 405, 51 So. 2d 781 (1951); Peff v.
Peff, 2 N.J. 513 67 A.2d 161 (1949); Morton v. Morton, 99 N.Y.S.2d 155 (N.Y.

Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950). Some of these states now have statutes allowing alimony
after divorce. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 34-23 (1951); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT
§ 1170-b.
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of the Florida court as not adjudicating the issue of alimony, 12 and
therefore allowed the wife recovery without reaching the question
of full faith and credit. 13 Four of the justices, however, felt that the
Florida court had affirmatively denied the wife recovery and that the
Ohio decision and the Florida decision were in conflict. 14 These justices
concurred in the result reached by the majority on the grounds that
the Florida decree was not entitled to full faith and credit insofar as
the issue of alimony was concerned. 5 Extending the doctrine of the
Estin case to include the right to support not previously reduced to
judgment, the concurring justices declared that the right to alimony
alone was such a property interest as to require personal jurisdiction
over the wife before it could be extinguished. Pointing out the well
settled rule that a court lacking personal jurisdiction over the husband
cannot render a valid alimony judgment against him,' 6 they found
no reason why the same rule should not apply to a judgment denying
alimony to the wife. As the Florida court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the wife in the previous proceedings, 17 the concurring justices
were of the opinion that the part of the Florida decree denying the
wife alimony was not entitled to full faith and credit.
While the view taken by the concurring justices may not be controlling on future decisions, it should be noted that there is no indication that the majority view is necessarily adverse to that of the concurring justices. 8 The position taken by the majority indicates their
sympathy with the predicament of the deserted wife. It is believed that
12. The Florida decree read thusly, "'This court therefore, finds the defend-

ant has not come into this court in good faith or made any claim to the
equitable conscience of the court and has made no showing of any need on
her part for alimony. It is, therefore, specifically decreed that no award of alimony be made to the defendant."' 350 U.S. at 575. (Emphasis added by the
Court.) The majority interpreted this decree as being a purely negative
assertion that it would not pass on the question. The Florida court proceeded,
however, to order the wife to return certain stocks and bonds to the husband.
Later the Ohio court ordered the husband to return these same stocks and
bonds to the wife. 350 U.S. at 575 n.l.
13. Actually only four of the justices were of this view. Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought the case should have been dismissed for "want of jurisdiction,"
but joined in Mr. Justice Minton's opinion. 350 U.S. at 574.
14. It should be pointed out that although Florida follows the divisible
divorce doctrine, Sorrells v. Sorrells, 82 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1955), under the
concurring Justices' interpretation of the Florida decree the Florida court
specifically held the wife not entitled to alimony. When the Ohio court held
that she was entitled to alimony this created a conflict.
15. The concurring Justices declared that Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S.
551 (1913), insofar as it conflicted with this view should be overruled.
16. See cases cited in 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 462.1 n.1 (1935).
17. While the Florida court found that there was personal jurisdiction of
both parties, under Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), this
finding was open to challenge by the Ohio court. The Ohio trial court found
that plaintiff had been a domiciliary of Ohio at the time of the Florida divorce
suit, and, therefore the Florida court did not gain personal jurisdiction over
plaintiff by constructive service. 350 U.S. at 578.
18. It should also be noted that the author of the majority opinion, Mr.
Justice Minton, has since retired.
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if a situation arises wherein a decision on the point becomes necessary, 19 the Court will adopt the view taken by the concurring justices
in the instant case.20

CONFLICT OF LAWS-FORUM NON CONVENIENS
APPLIED FOR PROTECTION OF LOCAL INTERESTS
Plaintiffs brought personal injury actions against the defendant in a
state court in Missouri for damages resulting from an automobile
accident in Kansas. All parties were residents of Kansas. After detailed
findings of fact,' the trial court concluded that the action was instituted
in Missouri because the plaintiffs' attorney considered the nine-man
Missouri jury more liberal than a twelve-man Kansas jury, and because the defendant did not want to be tried in his home town. 2 Thereupon, the court on its own motion refused to accept jurisdiction and
dismissed the action. Held, affirmed. Under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, a trial court may properly refuse to exercise its jurisdiction over a non-statutory tort action involving only non-residents
where the burdens on the court and on the real defendant (insurer)
outweigh the reasons for transplanting the action from its natural
forum. Elliott v. Johnston, 292 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1956).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens involves the discretionary
19. Subsequent to the instant case this situation was presented to the Court
of Appeals of New York. A husband had obtained a valid ex parte divorce
in Nevada. The effect of this divorce was to end any right of the wife to
alimony in Nevada, Sweeney v. Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431, 179 Pac. 638 (1919),
seemingly irrespective of whether or not the Nevada court adjudicated the
issue of alimony. Subsequently the wife sued for alimony in New York, where
alimony after divorce is allowed under section 1170-b of the New York Civil
Practice Act. On the basis of the instant case the New York court held that
the Nevada divorce did not bar the wife from recovering alimony in New York.
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553 (1956). It is not clear
from this opinion whether or not the court thought the Nevada court had
adjudicated the issue of alimony. Under the Nevada decisions the divorce
decree would have had the effect of terminating the wife's right to alimony
even if the issue had not been adjudicated; thus, the New York court in effect
followed the view of the concurring justices in the instant case.
20. See Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1287, 1302 (1951); 31
N.Y.U.L. REv. 947, 949 (1956).
1. These findings of fact were made in hearings upon motions to quash
service which were entered on behalf of defendant by lawyers of his insurance
company, who appeared under a reservation of rights agreement; and who, in
oral argument, stated that the insurance company was seeking a declaratory
judgment, in a United States District Court in Kansas. that defendant's conduct had released them from any obligation to defend or represent the defendant.
2. The court implied that defendant's reason for wanting the Missouri trial
was a factor weighing against the plaintiff since it considered the insurer to
be the real defendant even though the suit was in excess of the amount of the
insurance.

19571

RECENT CASES

power 3 of a court to refuse to hear and decide a controversy involving
a transitory cause of action if the action could be brought more conveniently elsewhere. 4 The doctrine presupposes at least two forums in
which the defendant is amenable to process and provides the criteria
for deciding between them.5 The factors generally considered by a
court in deciding whether it can properly dismiss a case under this
doctrine fall into three categories: the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial and effective administration of justice, the private
interests of the parties litigant, and the public interest in not concentrating litigation in congested areas. 6
Although courts may agree upon the wide variety of factors to be
considered in determining the applicability of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, they do not agree upon the relative importance and
effect of those factors. This disagreement arises because courts which
have applied the doctrine are not in accord on whether it is designed to
serve the convenience of the parties litigant or the convenience of local
3. Distinguish cases where the refusal to entertain suit is not based on the
disdretionary power of the court but is required because of public policy of
the state or because the court has no machinery for administering the remedy
required by the action, e.g., the inability of Texas courts to adjudicate rights of

parties in personal injury actions arising in Mexico as demonstrated in Carter
v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 800,
808 (1956).
The doctrine applies only where the court has jurisdiction it can exercise
over the parties. In other words, the doctrine provides an exception to the
general rule that a common-law court having jurisdiction of the parties and
subject matter will entertain the case regardless of the residence of the parties
and the place where the cause of action arose. Price v. Atcheson, T. & S.F.
By., 42 Cal. 2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954).
4. All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
5. "In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into
play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable
to process . . . ." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506 (1947). Compare
the more narrow requirement set out in Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Interstate Circuit,
Inc., 167 F.2d 155, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 837 (1948). "At least two
such forums must be open to the plaintiff before the doctrine comes into play;
and they shall not be dependent merely upon the will or grace of the defendant, but must be provided by law." (Emphasis added.) Quaere, ifthe statute
of limitations has run in the other forum: Does this make the doctrine inapplicable and thus deprive the court of discretion to refuse jurisdiction or does
it merely become a factor to be considered in exercising discretion under the
doctrine? What if defendant waives the plea of statute of limitations as a
condition to a judgment of dismissal? See Weed v. Smith, 15 N.J. Super. 250,
83 A.2d 305 (App. Div. 1951) (semble-dismissal by trial court on grounds of
forum non conveniens even though statute had run in other forum, was
reversed with language indicating that the trial court had no discretion in the
matter). But cf. Randle v. Inecto, Inc., 131 Misc. 261, 226 N.Y. Supp. 686 (Sup.
Ct. 1928) (a matter of discretion). See also Anderson v. Delaware, L. & W.
R.R., 18 N.J. Misc. 153, 11 A.2d 607 (Cir. Ct. 1940) (dismissal conditioned on
defendant's waiving statute of limitations discussed); Barrett, The Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAzw. L. Ray. 380, 421 (1947); Foster, Place of Trial
-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARV. L. Rav.
41, 50 (1930).
6. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), Mr. Justice Jackson
has set out in detail a guide to the various factors which have been catagorized
under the three general headings listed here.
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interests such as the court itself, local taxpayers, or local litigants.7
Courts which stress local interests generally require that the moving
party show only that there is little connection between the chosen
forum and the action to be tried. Once this is done, the action will be
dismissed unless the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the
dismissal will cause him undue hardship or injustice. 8 On the other
hand, where the court stresses the interests of the litigants, emphasis
is on achieving justice between the parties9 and plaintiff's choice of
forum will not be disturbed ° unless the moving party can show that
the plaintiff will gain an unfair advantage if the action is entertained.,
The instant case represents the first application of the doctrine, as
such, in Missouri. 12 The holding adds weight to those authorities which,
emphasizing local interests, hold that if the cause of action has little
nexus to the forum state, local taxpayers should not be burdened with
the expense of furnishing a forum for non-residents unless special circumstances are shown to exist which justify retention of the action.
Since this dismissal came as a result of the court's own motion, it may
be that the court thinks the question should be treated as if it were in
the nature of a jurisdictional problem. If so, this would indicate that
the motion may be made at any stage of the proceedings.
It seems only fair that where the plaintiff brings his suit to vex and
harass the defendant or to put him to such expense as to force an
unfair settlement, the court should thwart abuse of its process by
refusing to entertain the suit. In this case it would seem incumbent on
the defendant to show that plaintiff was seeking, not just the advan7. See Barrett, supra note 5, at 410-15.
8. See, e.g., Reep v. Butcher, 176 Misc. 369, 27 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sup. Ct. 1941).

9. "Those entitled to [the court's process] . . . should not be compelled to
resort to a species of incantation, catch as catch can . . . to effectuate it."

Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 169 So. 391, 395 (1936); Kantakevich v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 18 N.J. Misc. 77, 10 A.2d 651 (Cir. Ct. 1940); Bethlehem
Fabricators, Inc. v. H.D. Watts Co., 286 Mass. 556, 190 N.E. 828 (1934).
10. "But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). Expressions elsewhere in this opinion may be said to
weaken the force of the rule quoted.
11. This view has been expressed by the Scottish cases. "'It is a valuable discretion, which is vested in every court, not to exercise its jurisdiction if there
are grounds for holding that, by the exercise of that jurisdiction, the defender,
who objects to it, will be put to an unfair disadvantage which he would not be
subjected to in another accessible and competent court. But it lies on the
person taking that objection to show that he will be put to some unfair disadvantage by the case being tried here,-for instance, that materials of
evidence will not be forthcoming; as, where all the books of a going concern
are abroad and all the parties who are to give evidence are abroad. It is not
enough to show that the defense will have a better chance of succeeding if the
case be tried in the other country. In a question of that kind we must look to
the interests of the pursuer as well as of the defender, and the thing to be
shewn, is, not that there will be disadvantage in that sense, but that there
will be an unfair disadvantage, so that justice is not likely to be done.'" Annot.,
32 A.L.R. 6, 29 (1924), quoting from an 1865 Scottish decision.
12. 292 S.W.2d at 591.
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tages that naturally flow from the difference in the forums available in
a transitory action, but rather to gain an unfair advantage 13 of the
defendant. Beyond this, there seems to be merit in the criticism of the
doctrine voiced by Goodrich: ". . . if one state shuts its courts to residents of another state, there may be retaliation by the other state. In
the long run there will probably be no gain but a loss and it would
seem more desirable, on the whole, to allow free flow of litigation."'14
This does not mean that some courts should be permitted to become
"dumping grounds for litigation." It means only that the unilateral
doctrine of forum non conveniens cannot fairly solve the whole problem. As our citizens become increasingly mobile, the shortcomings of
our system of personal jurisdiction based on mere personal service
will become increasingly pronounced. The solution is not increased
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but a general
reform 5 specially designed to cope with the problem in a manner
which will not create uncertainties and evils as undesirable as those it
16
is intended to correct.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTEXISTING AUTOMOBILE DEALERSHIP CONTRACT MAY BE
CHANGED TO PROTECT THE GENERAL WELFARE
An automobile dealership contract entered into by plaintiff and defendant, manufacturer and dealer, respectively, permitted termination
of the franchise by either party upon sixty days notice. Plaintiff gave
notice of termination and thereafter sought to recover on several
promissory notes given by defendant for the purchase of automobiles.
Defendant counter-claimed for damages alleging that the termination
constituted a breach of contract under a Minnesota statute,' passed
while the contract was in existance, which made cancellation of an
2
automobile dealership contract without just cause a criminal offense.
13. See note 11 supra.
14. GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 23 (3d ed. 1949).

15. See, e.g., Ehrensweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction:The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 313 (1956), for the
suggestion that a mechanism of interstate transfer of cases be devised to
assure "the Wlaintiff of the opportunity to bring his defendant into court yet
protecting the defendant against captious choice of forum." See also Foster,
supra note 5, at 49-53.
16. For example, consider the unwitting plaintiff, who, after incurring
considerable expense in bringing his action in one forum, may find that the
court disagrees with his views of the appropriateness of the forum and by
dismissing his action may leave him financially unable to pursue his remedy
in the "more convenient forum."
1. Mn4N. STAT. ANNr. § 168.27 (14) (3) (Supp. 1956).
2. Id. § 168.27 (12).
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Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the counter-claim alleging
that the statute was an unconstitutional interference with the obligation of contracts. 3 Held, motion denied. A statute which prohibits
the cancellation of automobile dealership contracts without just cause
is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and as such does
not violate the Constitutions of the United States or Minnesota4 even
when applied to contracts in existance at the time of its passage. Willys
Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc. 142 F. Supp. 469 (D.
Minn. 1956).
The "contract clause" of the federal constitution 5 provides that no
7
6
state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of any contract.
It is well established that the obligations of a contract are determined
by reference to the laws of the jurisdiction existing at the time the
contract was created. These laws form a part of the contract as if they
were incorporated expressly in its terms,8 and they prescribe the
regulations which govern its performance. 9 Furthermore, the reservation of the right of the government to enact reasonable measures to
protect the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of its people 10
3. Since the statute Was enacted thirty-five days after notice of termination
was given, plaintiff also argued that defendant's interpretation of the act would
give it an unconstitutional ex post facto effect. The court found no such effect,
holding that the statute prohibited cancellation without just cause and not
the giving of notice of cancellation. 142 F. Supp. at 470. But see Buggs v.
Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940).
4. Accord, Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420
(1955).
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See also MINN. CONST. art I, § 11.
6. The amount and extent of impairment is immaterial. Bank of Minden v.
Clement, 256 U.S. 126, 128 (1921); Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U.S. 105, 112
(1917); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 256 (1827).
7. The "contract clause" prohibits only impairment by legislative enactment and not decisions or acts of courts. Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29, 31
(1924); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1924); McCoy v. Union
Elevated R.R., 247 U.S. 354, 363 (1918); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913);
Cross Lake Club v. Louisiana, 224 U.S. 632, 638 (1912). It does not prohibit
impairment by acts of state officials. Hanford v. Davies, 163 U.S. 273, 278 (1896),
nor impairment by acts of administrative boards, New Orleans Waterworks
Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U.S. 18, 30 (1888).
8. Worthern Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429, 430 (1934); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v.
Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 439 (1903); Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 774
(1882); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 601 (1877); Walker v. Whitehead, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 314, 317 (1872); Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 535, 550 (1866); McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 607, 611,
612 (1844).
9. Worthern Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 62 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 430 (1934); Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245
U.S. 105, 112 (1917); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 601 (1877); Gunn v.
Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610, 623 (1872); State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300, 320 (1872); McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
607,612 (1844).
10. The "contract clause" does not protect certain contracts-Illegal: Griffith
v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563, 571 (1910). Invalid: Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
R.R. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 1, 15 (1900). Without Consideration:Pearsall v. Great
Northern Ry., 161 U.S. 646, 647 (1896). Ultra Vires: New Orleans v. New
Orleans Waterworks Co., 142 U.S. 79, 88 (1891).
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is read into all contracts," and this right prevails over contractual
rights of individuals. 12 Nor is the right which a state has to protect the
general welfare of its people limited to the protection of public safety,
health, morality, 13 peace and quiet, or law and order; 14 but extends to
economic needs as well. 5 A statute adopted in a legitimate exercise
of police power must be for a public end, must not be arbitrary or oppressive, and must be adapted to the accomplishment of that end.' 6
Such a statute will be upheld even though it destroys existing con17
tractual rights.
The court in the instant case found a statutory impairment of plaintiff's contractual obligation 8 but concluded that the impairment resulted from a justifiable exercise of the power reserved to the state
to protect the general welfare of the people and did not violate the
federal or state constitution. The court considered the statute to be
for a public purpose-that of alleviating an adverse economic condition which affected a large element of the population and a substantial
segment of the economy. 19 The automobile industry has been referred
to as probably the most important single industry in the economy of
the United States,2° and the automobile as the most important manufactured product.2 1 Out of the manufacturer-dealer relationship created
for the marketing of this product have arisen problems of inequality
and coercion2 which have had a marked effect on the industry2 and
11. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434, 435 (1934).
12. Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935); Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisedell, 290 U.S. 398, 436 (1934); Chicago & A.R.R. v.
Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 77 (1915); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480
(1905); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drainage Comm'n 197 U.S. 453, 460 (1905).
13. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 436 (1934).
14. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
15. Veix v. Sixth Ward Ass'n. 310 U.S. 32, 38, 39 (1940); Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934).
16. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936).
17. See cases cited note 12 supra.
18. 142 F. Supp. at 471.
19. The court pointed out that 1,400 Minnesota automobile dealers as well
as "thousands of others" were affected. Id. at 472.
20. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary,84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 3161 (1956).
The average investment for dealers is over $100,000, and the aggregate is over
$4,000,000. Note, 31 IND. L.J. 233, 240 n.44 (1956). There are some 40,000
dealers employing more than 700,000 people-a 37 billion dollar business in
1954. Business Week, Dec. 17, 1955, p. 30. There were 5.3 million new cars
sold in 1954. Business Week, Feb. 19, 1955, p. 56.
21. Note, 31 IND. L.J. 233 (1956).
22. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 398 (7th Cir.
1941); La Porte Heinekamp Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 24 F.2d 861, 863
(D. Md. 1928); McMaster, Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 F.2d 469, 475
(E.D.S.C. 1925).
23. Note, 31 IND. L.J. 233 (1956) (significant decline in last three years of
dealer's profits as a percent of sales; many bankruptcies and voluntary withdrawals from business). Newsweek, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 71 (dealers complain
fierce competition forces them into unsound pricing); Business Week, Jan. 16,
1954, p. 28 (rise in dealer mortality); Time, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 80 (statement by
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which have been repeatedly treated as subjects for investigation,2 4
legislation,2 and litigation.26 This condition of unbalance or unrest
between the elements of production and distribution in an industry
of such magnitude was considered substantial enough to justify an
impairment of a constitutionally protected individual liberty under
27
the state's power to protect the general welfare of the public.
Once a court has found legislative impairment of a contract, it must,
in order to determine the future of the statute, decide whether the
impairment is for a public purpose or is arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable. The test of reasonableness then becomes the touchstone
in determining the right of the state to enforce the needs of the general
public over the rights of individuals. The problem of the practitioner
will be to decide whether every statute will be presumed constitutional
unless clearly proven otherwise, 28 or whether every impairment of
liberty will be presumed unconstitutional until proven to be a reasonable exercise of the power to govern.29 The Supreme Court, after a
period of agitation, has indicated that it will presume the constitutionality of the statute. 30
If constitutional government and a system of free enterprise are to
survive, the citizens must be protected not only from adverse economic
plight but also from unnecessary and unreasonable governmental restraints.31 It should be noted that in the instant case the result of this
Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney: "manufacturers have contrived to put themselves in an impregnable position, while the dealer is at their mercy." Statement by Senator A. S. Monroney: 'Ethical standards are deteriorating to the
business morality of an Oriental bazaar. If conditions do not change, the traditional pattern of the franchised dealer will disapper. In its place you will

find a supermarket operation.").
24. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 20.
25. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 1026, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Aug. 8, 1956), enabling
dealers to sue in Federal District Courts to recover twofold damages sustained
by failure of manufacturers to act in good faith in complying with terms of
franchise. Some twenty states have enacted legislation protecting the manu-

facturer-dealer relationship. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 320.60-.70 (1943);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 322.3 (1949); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 8072-74 (1942); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 60-611 (1952); VA. CODE ANN. § 46-534 (1950); WIS. STAT. § 218.01

(1955). See also Note, 31 IND. L.J. 233, 234 n.6 (1956).
26. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.
1941); General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956);
La Porte Heinekamp Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 24 F.2d 861 (D. Md. 1928);
Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955).
27. See notes 25 and 26 supra. See also 16 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 6720
(1956).
28. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1877).
29. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923).
30. This presumption was prevalent after the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment but was replaced around the turn of the century by the presumption that every impairment of liberty is unconstitutional. The former presumption appears to have been revived again, at least in part, by the Court in 1934.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
31. This presents the problem of arriving at a just balance between the
strict preservation of constitutional rights on the one side and protection of
the general welfare through police power on the other. In solving this problem

1957 ]

RECENT CASES

exercise of governmental power is severe. In creating a virtual permanent tenure for all dealers, the court changed a privilege granted by
32
the manufacturer into a vested right enforceable against him. The
Supreme Court once stated, "Freedom is the general rule and restraint
the exception";33 but if this trend of government to relieve adverse
economic plight at the expense of constitutional liberties continues,
restraint may become the general rule, freedom the exception.

CRIMINAL LAW-BIGAMY-GOOD FAITH BELIEF THAT
ACCUSED WAS DIVORCED IS A DEFENSE
TO A CHARGE OF BIGAMY
In a prosecution for bigamy,' defendant attempted to introduce
evidence tending to show a good faith belief that hi& first wife had
obtained a divorce prior to his second marriage. The evidence consisted of a notification that she had taken out a driver's license in her
maiden name, and that she later openly cohabited with another man
2
as his wife. The trial court, following prior California decisions,
ruled that since criminal intent is not an element of the crime of
bigamy, defendant's evidence showing good faith belief that he was
free to marry was not admissible. Held, reversed. A good faith belief
that one is divorced is a good defense to a charge of bigamy, and a
statute that enumerates certain defenses does not eliminate the general
defense of lack of intent to commit a crime. People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d
850 (Cal. 1956).
Generally, an indictment for bigamy must allege that the accused
was previously married, that this spouse is still living, and that the
accused has remarried. 3 The majority of jurisdictions hold that mens
such facts as those presented in notes 20 and 23 supra must be weighed against
the reasons for the protection found in the "contract clause." These reasons
were discussed by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427, 428 (1934)

(need of a thorough reform to inspire

a general prudence and industry and give a regular course to the business of
society); and by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213, 354, 355 (1827)

(to guard against the power of changing the

relative situation of debtor and creditor which had been used to such an extent
by the state legislatures as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society
and destroy all confidence between man and man).
32. Perhaps plaintiff could have raised a more effective defense by urging
that the statute violates the fourteenth amendment in that it fails to provide
an ascertainable standard of guilt and hence denies due process. This was done
in General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 395 (D. Colo. 1956).
33. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923).
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 281 (Deering 1949).
2. People v. Hartman, 130 Cal. 487, 62 Pac. 823 (1900).
3. 7 Am. JuR., Bigamy § 33 (1937).
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rea, or intent to commit a criminal act, is not an element of bigamy
and that evidence of a contrary intent is not admissible. 4 One exception recognized by these statutes is the "Enoch Arden" situation in
which the accused remarries after the first spouse has been missing
for a statutory period of time. 5 Courts have justified their refusal to
recognize lack of intent as a defense by pointing out that the accepted
rules of statutory construction preclude all defenses except those
enumerated in the statute,6 or by holding that a good faith, but mistaken, belief that one is free to marry is a mistake of law and thus no
defense. 7 The trend toward liberality was begun by those courts
which held that an accused could not be convicted of bigamy after a
court of apparent jurisdiction had granted a divorce decree valid on
its face and the accused had taken care to determine that such a decree
had been entered, even though the divorce is later held invalid. 8 At the
present time, courts allowing a defense based upon a bona fide belief of
a prior divorce have either read into the statutes a requirement of
mens rea9 or have held that the accused acted under a mistake of fact,
which is a general defense to a criminal charge. 10 While statutes have
specifically exempted other offenses from the requirement of criminal
intent on the basis of overruling considerations of public peace and
welfare, these are normally limited to misdemeanors" which involve
the possibility of considerable public harm in relation to the penalty
exacted. In such cases one acts at his peril if he fails to determine the
nature of his act. This same treatment has been applied to certain
felonies, e.g., the sale or possession of narcotics, 12 or the carnal knowledge of a female under the statutory age of consent,13 where the harm
to the public welfare is felt to be so great as to outweigh any possible
injustice to an innocent violator. But it is submitted that these felonies
normally involve some type of action, i.e., handling drugs and sexual
intercourse with a young female, which, by their very nature, warn
the actor of the potential risk of committing an offense, a warning
which marriage does not convey.
The instant case holds that any evidence tending to show good faith
4. Ellison v. State, 100 Fla. 736, 129 So. 887 (1930); People v. Spoor, 235 Ill.
230, 85 N.E. 207 (1908); Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472
(1844); Burnley v. State, 201 Miss. 234, 29 So. 2d 94 (1947). Two states, however, include an element of scienter in their statutes. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-56001
(1953); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:76(3) (1950).
5. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1101 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.11 (1945);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:92-1 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-701, -702 (1956).
6. State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15, 245 Pac. 375 (1926).
7. McConico v. State, 49 Ala. 6 (1873).
8. Long v. State, 44 Del. (5 Terry) 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949).
9.Ibid.

10. Adams v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 20, 7 S.W.2d 528 (1928).

11. New Jersey punishes bigamy as a "high misdemeanor." N.J.
§2A:92-1 (1953).
12. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
13. 44 AM. Jur., Rape § 41 (1937).
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reliance on a prior divorce is admissible. Thus, this court joins the

few logical holdings that one can no more be guilty of committing the
felony of bigamy than any other felony, unless he is to some extent
aware of, or chargeable with, knowledge of hiq wrongful conduct. 14
This case gives a refreshing impetus to the trend, begun by Squire
v. State's and brought to a focus by Long v. State,16 away from the
harsh and unrealistic attitude of the earlier cases. 17 It repudiates
California's original adherence 18 to that line of legal hair-splitting and
places them squarely on the track of reasonable treatment for reasonable behavior. There seems little reason why bigamy should be considered more inimical of the public welfare and mores than murder,
robbery, or arson-all of which require mens rea. Nor is it any answer
to say that the executive branch of the government stands ready to
pardon unduly harsh cases,19 a contingency at best, upon which no
person accused of a felony should be forced to rely.

EVIDENCE-RELEVANCY-ADMISSION OF HABIT EVIDENCE
TO SHOW DUE CARE
In an action for wrongful death against a railroad, evidence of
decedent's habit to stop, look and listen at the crossing was admitted
over defendant's objection. The only eye-witness to the accident was
the fireman of the train involved. On appeal from a judgment for
plaintiffs, held, reversed. Admission of habit evidence in order to show
due care is prejudicial error when there is an eye-witness to the
accident, notwithstanding the fact that the eye-witness is an employee of the opposing party. Missouri-K.-T. R.R. v. McFerrin, 291
S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1956).
14. In general, see HALL, CRIMINAL LAW 138-68, 279-376 (1947). For the
historical treatment of bigamy, which was an ecclesiastical offense and not
punishable as a common-law felony until the statute of 1 JAC. 1, c. 11 (1604),
see I BisHop, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 297 (1881). For a criticism of rigid
construction of statutes, see McMurray, Changing Conceptions of Law and of
Legal Institutions, 3 CALIF. L. REV. 442, 452 (1915). On the subject of bigamy
and mistake, see Trowbridge, Criminal Intent and Bigamy, 7 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (1918); Note, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 415 (1950). For a scathing commentary on
the state of the law in this field, see the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
Black in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 261 (1945). For state
decisions, see Annot. 57 A.L.R. 792 (1928).
15. 46 Ind. 459 (1874) (very strong dictum often cited as authority).
16. 44 Del. (5 Terry) 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949).
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844).
18. People v. Hartman, 130 Cal. 487, 62 Pac. 823 (1900).
19. Statements to this effect are frequently made in cases where an honest
mistake is not allowed as a defense. See State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15,

245 Pac. 375 (1926). See also Trowbridge, Criminal Intent and Bigamy, 7
CALIF.

L. REV. 1 (1918)

(an attempt to defend the unreasonably harsh results

that may occur in these cases).
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Failure of the courts to distinguish between habit and character
evidence has many times caused the exclusion of relevant habit
evidence which otherwise might have been admitted.1 "Character
is a generalized descyiption of one's disposition, or of one's disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance or
peacefulness. ' 2 Habit "describes one's regular response to a repeated
specific situation."3 As a rule, of course, character evidence is inadmissible in a civil litigation.4 A party's character is generally of
little probative value in the ordinary contract or tort case. Furthermore, the admission of character evidence is likely to "turn the
litigation into an issue of the comparative moral standing of the
litigants. '5 It is readily seen that evidence of habit has much more
probative value than that of character.6
Courts that have considered the problem of admitting habit evidence
to show negligence or due care may be roughly divided into those
who admit or exclude such evidence without considering the presence
of eye-witnesses7 and those who admit or exclude such evidence depending upon whether or not there were eye-witnesses present.8 The
courts that apply the eye-witness rule have not considered the fact
that the eye-witness may be prejudiced, a sufficient reason for admitting habit evidence. 9 The reasons for exclusion are that such evidence
may unfairly surprise or prejudice the party against whom it is
offered, may raise a multitude of collateral issues or may confuse the
jury.10 However, courts have long admitted evidence of business habit
if reasonably regular and uniform," the only question being its
1. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 342

(1954);

1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 92 (3d ed.

1940). See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. McClish, 115 Fed. 268 (6th Cir. 1902);
Gillette Motor Transport, Inc. v. Kirby, 208 Okla. 68, 253 P.2d 139 (1952);
Missouri, K. &T. Ry. v. Johnson, 92 Tex. 380, 48 S.W. 568 (1898).
2. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 340-41 (1954).
3. Id. at 341.
4. 1 JONES, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 148 (4th ed. 1938); 1 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 64 (3d ed. 1940).

5. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 177-78 (1954).
6. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 341 (1954); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 92 (3d ed.
1940). "A man may be highly skillful and extremely careful in most of his

doings but far from skillful or careful in some of them. But a man who
habitually takes great care in doing act X is very likely to be careful in doing
it on a particular occasion." MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 178 (1954).
7. Admit: Allman v. Gulf & S.I.R.R., 149 Miss. 489, 115 So. 594 (1928); Stone
v. Boston & M.R.R., 72 N.H. 206, 55 Atl. 359 (1903). See also Hodges v. Hill,
175 Mo. App., 161 S.W. 633 (1913). Exclude: Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543,
86 So. 469 (1920); Central R.R. v. Ryals, 84 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 499 (1890); Brownhill v. Kivlin, 317 Mass. 168, 57 N.E. 2d 539 (1944).
8. Boone v. Bank of America, 220 Cal. 93, 29 P.2d 409 (1934); White v.
Shepardson, 116 Cal. App. 716, 3 P.2d 346 (1931); Young v. Patrick, 323 Ill.
200, 153 N.E. 623 (1926); Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912).
9. Petro v. Hines, 299 Ill. 236, 132 N.E. 462 (1921). See also Gillette Motor
Transport, Inc. v. Kirby, 208 Okla. 68, 253 P.2d 139 (1952).

10. See Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209 (1912); 4 CHAMBER§ 3159 (1913).
11. Moffit v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 527, 86 Atl. 16 (1913); Commonwealth v. Torrealba, 316 Mass. 24, 54 N.E.2d 939 (1944); Lundquist v. Jennison,
LAYNE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE
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sufficiency to justify a finding that the custom was followed in the
absence of other evidence. 12 Here, of course, there is not the same
13
danger of confusing habit and character.
Courts applying the eye-witness rule to habit evidence do so without any discussion of its basis. However, it would seem that admission
or exclusion should not depend on the presence or absence of eyewitnesses. 14 The evidence has the same probative value and the same
objections could be raised in either case. Apparently the courts reason
that habit evidence is preferable to no evidence at all and should be
admitted when it is the "best evidence" available.15 The Model Code
of Evidence 16 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence 17 both admit habit
evidence subject to certain qualifications, and there seems to be
little doubt that such evidence has probative value. 8 It is submitted
that habit evidence should be admitted when it meets the two requirements of Dean Wigmore-sufficient recurrence to constitute habit
and similar circumstances'Q-whether or not there were eye-witnesses
present.20 However, the trial judge should be allowed wide discretion
66 Mont. 516, 214 Pac. 67 (1923); Buxton v. Langan, 90 N.H. 13, 3 A.2d 647

(1939).
12. Probably a majority of the courts rule that such evidence alone is insufficient to justify such a finding. Lieb v. Webster, 30 Wash. 2d 43, 190
P.2d 701 (1948); Frank v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 613, 277 N.W.
643 (1938). Contra, Myers v. Moore-Kile Co., 279 Fed. 233 (5th Cir. 1922);
Prudential Trust Co. v. Hayes, 247 Mass. 311, 142 N.E. 73 (1924).
13. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 343 (1954); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 95 (3d ed.

1940).
14. See Cereste v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 231 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1956).
The use of the eye-witness rule also raises certain other problems. There is
sometimes a question of whether or not a person is an eye-witness. See
Wallis v. Southern Pac. Co., 184 Cal. 662, 195 Pac. 408 (1921); Elliott v. Elgin,
J. & E. Ry., 325 Ill. App. 161, 59 N.E.2d 486 (1945). A problem is also raised
when the credibility of the eye-witness is strongly impeached. See Sawyer
v. Fleming, 336 Ill. App. 268, 83 N.E.2d 360 (1949). See also cases cited note
9 supra.
15. The "best evidence rule" is, of course, properly confined to original
writings. "While some modern opinions still refer to the 'best evidence' notion
as if it were today a general governing legal principle most would adopt the
view of modern text writers that there is no such general rule. The only
actual rule that the 'best evidence' phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original writing." MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 409
(1954). See 1 ELLIOTT AND ELLIOTT, EVIDENCE § 217 (1904).
16. "Evidence of a habit of a person is admissible as tending to prove
that his behavior on a specified occasion conformed to the habit ....
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 307 (1942).

"

MODEL

17. "Testimony in the form of opinion is admissible on the issue of habit
or custom. Evidence of specific instances of behavior is admissible to prove
habit or custom if the evidence is of a sufficient number of such instances
to warrant a finding of such habit or custom." UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE,
rule 50 (1953).
18. "Of the probative value of a person's habit or custom, as showing the
doing on a specific occasion of the act which is the subject of the habit or
custom, there can be no doubt." 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 92 (3d ed. 1940).
19. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 376 (3d ed. 1940).
20. The evidence that decedent had in the past always stopped at the
crossing, looked and listened for trains before proceeding constitutes true
habit evidence and would be admitted under the suggested tests.
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"to exclude if the habit is not sufficiently regular and uniform, or
the circumstances sufficiently similar, to outweigh the danger, if any,
of prejudice or confusion." 21

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENTGOVERNMENT'S LIABILITY FOR SKYLARKING AIRCRAFT
Air Force personnel on a routine training flight disregarded instructions to remain within a local ninety mile area and to make practice
landings on a nearby air strip, but instead flew 300 miles to the pilot's
hometown. There the aircraft made two low-level accelerated passes
at the court house and, through the pilot's negligence, crashed injuring
the plaintiffs. In a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act' the trial
court found the United States liable for damages. Held (2-1), reversed.
The federal government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act on the doctrine of respondeat superior as interpreted by the law
of the place of the accident for damages caused by the negligence of a
pilot who leaves his authorized flying area to make low passes over
his own hometown. United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir.
1956), cert. granted,352 U.S. 963 (1957).
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the United States waives its
sovereign immunity and consents to be sued as a private person where
damages to a plaintiff were caused by the negligent conduct of a
government employee acting within the scope of his employment.2
The language of this act insulates the government from absolute liability by requiring negligent conduct within the scope of one's employment, 3 rendering ineffectual state common-law and statutory
21. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 342 (1954). For a general collection of cases,
see Annots., 18 A.L.R. 1109 (1922), 15 A.L.R. 125 (1921).
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (1950).
2. "[Tlhe district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States, for money damages... for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or ommission occurred." 28 U.S.C.A. §
1346(b) (1950). But no punitive damages may be recovered under the act.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1950).
The Supreme Court seems to have adopted the policy that it should be construed liberally. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); United
States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
3. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45 (1953) (federal government
not liable because of operation of an extra-hazardous activity without proof
of a negligent act). For a noteworthy analysis of this case, see Heuser, Dalehite
v. United States: A New Approach to the FederalTort Claims Act?, 7 VAND. L.
REv. 175 (1954). See Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949)
(statute providing absolute liability upon owner for negligent acts of driver
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rules which impose absolute liability upon the owner of an aircraft
for injuries caused by its flight.4 Furthermore the act provides that,
in the case of military personnel, acting within the scope of employment means acting in line of duty.5 However, courts virtually obliterate this provision from the act in tort claims suits against the government for damages caused by its personnel, relegating the line of duty
test to the determination of benefit claims brought by or through
members of the armed services. 6 Whether one acts negligently within
the scope of his employment is generally said to be determined by the
law of the state in which the federal court sits, despite authority which
7
argues that the act should have a uniform interpretation everywhere.
does not bind federal government). Compare Strangi v. United States, 211
F.2d 305, 308 (5th Cir. 1954) ("any 'slight residue of theory of absolute liability' was disposed of in Dalehite v. United States ...

."),

with Hopson v.

United States, 136 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Ark. 1956) (absolute liability for nondelegable duty can be redressed under the federal act).
Perhaps the courts are attempting to limit the Dalehite case, in which there
was no proof of negligence, by distinguishing a situation where the government
employee is negligent. "However, the doctrine of respondeat superior in -itself
is also a type of absolute liability without fault .... [It] is not the type of
absolute liability without fault which was condemned in the Dalehite case ....
[Tihe Dalehite case merely construes the Tort Claims Act to requiie 'a
negligent act' and to be applicable to liability based solely upon 'ownership of
an
"inherently dangerous commodity" or property, or of engaging in an
"extra
hazardous" activity.'" Hopson v. United States, supra at 814. For a case
subsequent to Dalehite, commenting on its effect in military aircraft eases,
see United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
934 (1953) (government liable for damages arising out of crashes of its aircraft despite a South Carolina statute of absolute liability). For the most
recent case supporting this trend, see Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 315 (1957).
4. A Tennessee statute provides that the owner of an aircraft "is absolutely
liable for injuries to persons or property, caused by [the flight] whether such
owner was negligent or not .... ." TENN. CODE AwN. § 42-105 (1956).
Clearly the owner of a non-military aircraft would have been liable. But it
is held in the instant case that the United States has not consented to absolute
liability. "[Under the Federal Tort Claims Act] the United States has consented
to be sued only where a private person would be liable under the respondeat
superior doctrine. . . . [S]tate law imposing liability regardless of whether
the agent or servant was acting within the scope of his employment, or
absolute liability under any circumstances, is inapplicable and irrelevant."
236 F.2d at 653. Cf. note 3 supra.
5. "'Acting within the scope of his office or employment,' in the case of a
member of the military or naval forces of the United States, means acting in
line of duty." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (1950).
6. If the government's liability for negligent acts of military personnel
were determined by "line of duty" rather than "scope of employment," greater
liability would be applied. Although expanding governmental liability beyond
the ordinary respondeat superior doctrine of the state has met general disfavor, on the principle that the line of duty of, for example, a military driver
should be coextensive with that of a civilian driver, it seems that the duty of
a pilot entrusted with an aircraft would be broader. See Campbell v. United
States, 172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 957 (1949). "Line of duty"
is generally used to determine benefit claims by members of the armed
services as distinguished from suits by third persons under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. See cases cited note 7 infra.
7. Conflict among the circuits has existed as to whether federal or state law
governs the interpretation of scope of employment; this may now have been
settled. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) '(1950) provides that the United States may
be liable to a claimant "in accordance with the law of the place where the
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The court in the instant case applies the respondeat superior doctrine
of the state to determine whether the pilot acted within the scope of his
employment.
Under Tennessee law as well as the law generally the mere fact
that an employee is acting in disobedience to instructions from his
employer does not preclude a finding that he was acting within the
scope of his employment. 8 If,- however, the employee may be said to
step aside, for however short a time, from the general scope of his
employment to perform an act disconnected from it, the employer will
not be liable.9 In the instant case the court finds that the pilot by his
unauthorized conduct removed himself from the scope of his employment in three aspects. First, the geographical deviation from the
authorized flying area constituted departure from his employer's
act or omission occurred." But it also provides that for the purposes of the
Tort Claims Act "in the scope of employment" means "in line of duty." 28
U.S.C.A. § 2671 (1950).
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that state law determines whether
a federal employee acts within the scope of his employment. Sixth Circuit:
Christian v. United States, 184 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1950); Fries v. United States,
170 F.2d 726 (6th. Cir. 1948). Ninth Circuit: United States v. Wibye, 191 F.2d
181 (9th Cir. 1951); United States v. Johnson, 181 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1950);
Murphy v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950). See Marquardt v. United
States, 115 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Cal. 1953). On the other hand, the Fourth, Fifth
and Eighth Circuits seem to apply federal law. Fourth Circuit: United States
v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1951); see United States v. Eleazer, 177 F,2d
914 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903 (1950). Fifth Circuit: See Hubsch
v. United States, 174-F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1949); United States v. Campbell, 172
F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949). Eighth Circuit: United States v. Lushbough, 200 F.2d
717 (8th Cir. 1952) (dictum). See Yankwich, Problems Under the FederalTort
Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143, 150-52, 155-59 (1950); Gottlieb, State Law Versus
a Federal Common Law of Torts, 7 VAND. L. REV. 206 (1954).

However, in Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955), reversing 215
F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1954), the United States Supreme Court reversed a ruling
that scope of employment as regards a member of the armed services was to
be determined by federal law. The Court held, per curiam, "The case is controlled by the California doctrine of despondeat superior." See Rayonier, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (government liable for negligently allowing forest fire on its land to spread); Hopson v. United 'States, 136 F. Supp.
804 (W.D. Ark. 1956) (noting that apparently the question has been put to
rest by the Williams case).
8. Tennessee:. Eichengreen v. Louisville & N.R.R., 96 Tenn. 229, 34 S.W. 219
(1896) (railroad liable for act of detective beyond his authorization who falsely
imprisoned a passenger); McConnell v. Jones, 33 Tenn. App. 14, 228 S.W.2d
117 (M.S. 1949) (master liable for servant negligently leaving truck in road
in disobedience of instruction); Dalton v. Kopp, 2 Tenn. Civ. App. 619 (1911)
(employer liable for employee's wilfully rolling log down on plaintiff). See
Ferson, Bases For Master's Liability And For Principal'sLiability To Third
Persons, 4 VAND. L. REv. 260 (1951).

In general: New Jersey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett. 121 U.S. 637 (1887);
Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468 (1852). See
FERsoN, PRInCIPLES OF AGENCY 86 (1954); 2 MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 1874-98 (2d
ed. 1914) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 230 (1933).
9. See, e.g., McConville v. United States, 197 F.2d 680, (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 877 (1952) (army sergeant drove seven miles off path to authorized
destination for beer); Atlanta Baseball Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ga. App. 534, 144
S.E. 351 (1928) (player assaulted spectator during game for fancied insult);
Toombs v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 173 Tenn. 38, 114 S.W.2d 785 (1938) (night
watchman left place of employment to eat).
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business; second, the conduct of the pilot was extraordinary and
extreme, for which the employer is not responsible; and third, the
special purpose motivating the pilot's conduct was not within the
general purpose encompassing his employment.
Departure from the employer's business by geographical deviation
is widely recognized as removing the employee from the scope of his
employment. However, according to better reasoned authority, departure is only a factor to be considered, 10 at most creating a permissive presumption or an inference, 1 and is not a rule of substantive law.
And, in any event, the application of this concept to military aircraft
is difficult. 12 Extraordinary and forbidden conduct of the pilot, the
second ground, likewise should be treated as a factor to be considered
in determining whether the act is within the employment, but not
as a substantive rule of law.13 Copious authority holds that torts,
though wilful and malicious, 14 and possibly criminal, 15 may be within
the scope of employment if sufficiently connected with the employer's
business. The third and most determinative ground was that the
employee acted for a special purpose not encompassed by the general
purpose of his employment. The pilot's conduct, said the court, "was
the very antithesis of that encompassed by his course of employment."'1 6 Clearly the mere fact that the employee's act is personally
motivated does not remove him from his employment, provided he
acts for the employer's purpose at the same time or within the general
10. "The net result is that the place where an act occurred may be considered
as a factor, but only that, in determining whether an act was done within
the scope of a servant's employment." FERsoN, PRiNcipLEs OF AGENCY 85 (1954).
See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 229, 234 (1933).

11. See Bell Cab & U-Drive-It Co. v. Sloan, 193 Tenn. 352, 246 S.W.2d 41
(1952), noting the confusion regarding inferences, presumptions and rules of
substantive law.
12. The majority of cases cited by the court were cases involving an automobile driver deviating from a prescribed route for a personal purpose. See, e.g.,
Goff v. St. Bernard Coal Co., 174 Tenn. 418, 129 S.W.2d 205 (1939); Standard
Tire & Battery Co. v. Sherrill, 170 Tenn. 418, 95 S.W.2d 915 (1936). It is suggested that a military pilot whose purpose in flying is to become proficient
and who leaves a specified area is not well analogized to an auto driver deviating en route.
13. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 230 (1933) (forbidden acts), § 231 (criminal or
tortious acts).
14. See, e.g., Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (army
guard shot civilian with pistol when .engaged in an argument over civilian
parking in reserved area); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562
(W.S. 1945) (master liable for drunken truck driver's negligence-"the master's liability does not cease merely because the servant is acting contrary to
or in defiance of express instructions"). But see Terrett v. Wray. 171 Tenn.
448, 105 S.W.2d 93 (1937) (mother not liable for son's prank of wiring an
electric shock into car door); Druffenbroch v. Lawrence, 7 Tenn. Civ. App.
405 (1916) (master barber not liable to a customer maliciously slashed by hired
barber).
15. See, e.g., Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank,
199 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1952) (employer liable under doctrine of respondeat
superior for employee's theft from bank).
16. 236 F.2d at 654.
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purpose of his employment.17 Perhaps as the lower court held, 18 a
better analysis would be that the general purpose for which the
government had put the negligent operator in possession of the aircraft
was for acquiring experience in flying. The government employed this
pilot to fly, not to fly ninety miles and return. This may be distinguishable from automobile cases where the general purpose was to perform
a specific task.
It is suggested that the Court of Appeals may have read the state
law too literally, in that the cases cited are not close enough to constitute precedent binding on military aircraft, and that an important
factor to be considered in determining removal from the general scope
of employment is the high degree of accountability of military personnel to their superiors. Although it is not enunciated as a factor to be
considered, 19 and occasionally even applied without the court's recognition,2 0 the imposition of liability upon the master not only because his
purpose is served but also because he is in position to exercise discipline to discourage negligent conduct is bedrock in the historical foundation of respondeat superior.21 However, there appears little chance
that the case law limiting the federal act as it is generally recognized
will be changed without help from Congress, which is badly needed.
17. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 236 (1933).

18. See Taylor v. United States, Civil No. 859, W.D. Tenn., March, 1955;
instant case, 236 F.2d at 654.
19. The Restatement of Agency does however suggest that matters of fact
to be considered are whether the master has reason to expect that such act
will be done and whether the instrumentality by which the harm was done

was furnished by the master.

RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

§ 229(f), (h) (1933).

20. Cf. Nashville & C.R.R. v. Starnes, 56 Tenn. 52 (1871) (modified the
respondeat superior doctrine as to railroads, making them more nearly strictly
liable for tortious acts of their servants). Some cases show a disposition toward greater accountability on behalf of the government. See, e.g., Murphey
v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950) (government liable where
soldier in army truck, which he had permission to take into town, had accident on way to entertainment outside town); Hopper v. United States, 122
F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 214 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1954)
(government liable for accident of recruiting sergeant driving own car).
21. "[S]ince [the employer] knows of the liability for the torts of his servants, he can and should consider this liability as a cost of his business....
"[E]mployers have a considerable measure of control over the lives of their
servants; employers are in a good position to discourage the commission of
torts by their servants. The employee who commits a tort may be punished.
...Yet, there would be little incentive for employers to punish wrongdoing
servants if there were no responsibility for their wrongs. The liability afforded by the application of the rule of respondeat superior supplies this incentive. Servants who cannot be reached by the law directly, are deterred
from committing torts through threatened and actual punishment by their
masters." Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor,29 ILL. L. REV. 339,
340-41 (1934).
Dean Ferson points out, "Another argument under the entrepeneur theory is
that a master, knowing that he is responsible, will be alert to prevent the
occurrence of injuries." FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY 34 (1954).

Furthermore, this concept may be the foundation of the Family Purpose
Doctrine. "The father's right to control may be an incident of... his relationship as father ...

."

Id. at 117.
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INCOME TAXATION-RESERVE WITHHELD BY FINANCE
COMPANY AND CHARGEABLE WITH AMOUNT OF
DISHONORED NOTES NOT ACCRUABLE AS
INCOME TO INDORSER
Petitioner, a dealer in house-trailers, was an accrual basis taxpayer.
As a part of the sales price of trailers he received notes which he sold
to a finance company without recourse. The finance company withheld a portion of the purchase price of the notes, which it credited
to a "dealers' reserve," chargeable with any note becoming due and
unpaid. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency for petitioner's failure
to report the amount withheld by finance company as income in the
year of the sale of the notes. On appeal from a determination of the
Tax Court in favor of the Commissioner, held, reversed. Amounts
withheld from the purchase price of notes as a reserve chargeable
with dishonored notes are not income to an accrual basis taxpayer at
the time of the sale of the notes. Johnson v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d
952 (4th Cir. 1956).
With an accrual basis taxpayer it is the right to receive and not the
actual receipt that determines the inclusion of an item in gross income.'
Income accrues when there arises a fixed and unconditional right
to receive the item, even though actual payment is deferred. 2 In sales
contracts the purchase price is usually held accruable as of the time
title passes. 3 Claims contested in their entirety need not be accrued,
but claims contested only as to amount are accruable when and if a
reasonable estimate of probable receipt can be made. 4 Amounts held
in escrow are accruable when the right to withdraw becomes fixed,
not when the amounts are placed in escrow. 5 An amount withheld
from a contract price to guarantee performance of a service, which
is not a condition precedent to the right to receive the full contract
1. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934); 2 MERTENS,

§ 12.60 (1955).
2. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 1.

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

3. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930); Commissioner v.

Segall, 114 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1940). Sometimes trade practice is consulted,
as with sales of fungibles. United States v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 96 F.2d
756 (10th Cir. 1938) (accrual at the time of the contract when parties in the
trade regarded title as passing at this time rather than at time of segregation

and

shipping).

4. Disputed in entirety and not accruable:H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner,
90 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1937) (amount of judgment accurable when right of
defendant to appeal expired); Apex Elec. Mfg. Co. 16 T.C. 1171 (1951) (war
contract claim settlement, not received until 1947, not accruable in 1944 although enabling statute enacted in 1944); Boston Elevated Ry., 16 T.C. 1084
(1951) (amount of claim against state not accruable while still subject to

contest or active litigation). Accruable though amount disputed: Continental

Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290 (1932).
5. Leedy-Glover Realty and Ins. Co., 13 T.C. 95 (1949).
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price, .has been .held not accruable before the performance of the
6
service for which it is held as security.
This test-the unconditional right to receive-has been applied
to transactions of the type in the instant case. If the notes are indorsed without recourse and the reserve is security for general indebtedness and not for the particular notes involved, the right to receive is unconditional; and the amount withheld is accruable as of
the time of the sale of the notesJ On the other hand, if the seller
guarantees payment of the notes and the parties have agreed that the
amount withheld is chargeable with dishonored notes, it has been
held that the amount is not accruable since the right to receive is conditioned upon timely payment by the maker.8
In the instant case the notes were sold without recourse, but the
agreement under which they were sold provided that the amount withheld was chargeable with dishonored notes. Previous cases have
reached conflicting results on substantially identical facts. 9 This court
concluded that, although the notes were indorsed without recourse,
the agreement between the parties subjected the right to receive to the
contingency of non-payment by the maker; thus, the amount of the
reserve was not accruable as of the time of the sale of the notes.
The holding in this case does not mean that in all such transactions
between dealers and finance companies the amount withheld will not
be accruable as of the time of the sale. However, if the notes are sold
with recourse, or if the dealer independently promises to guarantee
payment of the notes, or if the standing agreement under which the
notes are sold provides that the amount withheld is chargeable with
dishonored notes, the right to receive is subject to the contingency of
non-payment by the maker and the amount withheld is not accruable.
If none of these conditions are present, the right to receive is unconditional and the amount withheld is accruable as of the time of the
sale of the notes, even though the time of actual receipt is deferred.
Not only do these results harmonize with other applications of the
test of the unconditional right to receive, but they also appear to accord
with accepted accounting procedure. The holding of the instant
case, therefore, would appear correct and if properly analyzed should
do much to remedy the apparent confusion in this area. 10
6. Commissioner v. Cleveland Trinidad Paving Co., 62 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.
1932) (percentage of contract price for street paving retained by municipalities to guarantee maintenance of paving for stipulated period).
7. Shoemaker-Nash, Inc., 41 B.T.A. 417 (1940); Royal Motors, Inc., P-H1 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 145255.
8. Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. United States, 141 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1944).
But see Town Motors, Inc., P-H 1946 T.C. Mem. Dec. f46173.
9. Ray Wood Used Cars, Inc., P-H 1952 T.C. Mem. Dec. 52290 (accruable);
Beaudry, P-H 1941 B.T.A. Mem. Dec. 141114 (not accruable).
10. Since the drafting of this article the Internal Revenue Service has issued
the following ruling: "1954 Code Secs. 61, 166: Gross income defined: Dealers'
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LABOR LAW-SECONDARY BOYCOTTS-TWO EMPLOYERS
OWNED AND CONTROLLED BY SAME PERSONS
ARE NOT ALLIES PER SE
Defendant union, seeking recognition from the building materials
supply houses, attempted to obtain the aid of the general contractors
in the area by requesting them to enforce a provision in their collective bargaining agreement which stated that employees of the contractors were not to install lumber pre-cut by non-union carpenters.
After the requests proved ineffective, the union struck at a project of
one of the contracting companies which had purchased pre-cut lumber
for the project from a non-union business supply house, owned and
controlled by the same people who owned and controlled the contracting company. The regional director of the NLRB, acting on a
complaint brought by the general contractor,' sought an injunction
against the defendant to prevent an illegal secondary boycott; the
union defended on the ground that the two corporations were "allies"
by virtue of the fact of common ownership and management and that
the strike was thus lawful primary activity. 2 Held, injunction granted.
Where an illegal secondary boycott is alleged, the proper test to
determine whether two employers are "allies" is not their connection
through ownership, management and control, but rather their conreserves: Bad debts.-Amounts withheld by banks or finance companies to

cover possible losses on notes purchased from dealers constitute income to
dealers employing the accrual method of accounting, to the extent of their
interest therein at the time the amounts are recorded on the books of the
bank or finance company as a liability to the dealer, regardless of whether
charges for worthless notes are also made to the account pursuant to an agreement between the parties. Losses sustained on worthless notes shall be separately established by the dealer as required by section 166 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954." Rev. Rul. 57-2, 1957 INT. REv. BULL. No. 1, at 12. The
instant case has not persuaded the Internal Revenue Service to change its
position. Nevertheless, as this article attempts to point out, such a ruling is inconsistent with the test of "an unconditional right to receive." It would appear
that the Service should recognize this inconsistency, revoke this ruling and
adopt the holding of the instant case.
1. The complainant alleged that the labor union was engaging in an unfair
labor practice in violation of section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 140 1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (4) (A)
(1956), amending 49 STAT. 452 (1935) .
2. The union also contended that the clause in the collective bargaining
agreement which reserved to the union the right to refuse to handle lumber
pre-cut by non-union carpenters-a so-called "hot cargo" clause-took the
activity of the union from within the provisions of the section. The court,
however, held that a contractual waiver of the provisions of the act dealing
with secondary boycotts could not be given legal effect, as the purpose of
the act was to protect the public in general. But see Douds v. Sheet Metal
Workers Ass'n, 101 F. Supp. 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). The position of the NLRB
is that section 8(b) (4) (A) does not apply to refusals to handle "unfair" or
struck goods if such refusal accords with an existing collective bargaining
agreement in which the union has reserved to itself the right to handle the
"unfair" goods. 18 NLRB AwN. REP. 49 (1953).
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nection through the activities of the corporations. Alpert v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters,143 F. Supp. 371 (D. Mass. 1956).
Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Management Relations
Act 3 makes it an unlawful labor practice for a union or its agents to
engage in or induce or encourage employees 4 of any employer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal 5 to work or perform any services
-where an object thereof6 is to force any employer to cease doing business with any other person.7 This provision has been interpreted to
outlaw secondary boycotts, 8 generally defined as a combination to influence one person by exerting economic or social pressure against
Others who deal with that person. 9 Where picketing of the premises is
employed, the courts have ordinarily deemed such picketing to be legal
primary activity so long as the picketing is limited to the premises
3. More specifically, this section of the act provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for the labor organization:
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of the
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport or otherwise handle
or work on goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . . any
employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person .
61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1956).
4. In order for the union's conduct to be illegal secondary activity, it must
be addressed to the rank-and-file employees; it is not illegal secondary activity for a union to induce employers or their agents, including supervisory
employees, to engage in a strike or concerted refusal. Consolidated Frame
Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1950); Arkansas Express, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 255 (1951).
A recent decision of a federal circuit court, however, leaves some doubt as to
the standing of this doctrine. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
v. NLRB, 237 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1956) (union's activity in requesting owners of
meat markets and their agents not to purchase products of Swift & Co., with
whom the union was engaged in a labor dispute, was illegal secondary
activity).
5. The "concerted refusal" requirement is not satisfied, when read in connection with the phrase "employees in the course of their employment," if only
a single employee is involved. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 82
N.L.R.B. 1195, rev'd sub nom. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades
Council, 186 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd and decision of NLRB aff'd, 341 U.S.
675 (1951). But see Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v.
NLRB, 237 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1956).
6. It is sufficient if one object of the strike is to force the employer to cease
doing business with another even if another legal object is present, and such
legal object is the main one. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
7. It should be noted that this section, standing alone, is broad enough to
prohibit even traditional primary activity by a labor organization; however,
the courts have read this section in relation with the other sections of the
act, and have found dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of
labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in
primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others
from pressure in controversies not their own. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
8. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).
9. Cushman. Secondary Boycotts and the Taft-Hartley Law, 6 SYnAcuss L.
Ray. 109 (1954).
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of the primary employer, although it is necessarily designed to induce
and encourage third persons to cease doing business with the picketed
employer; 10 whereas the picketing of a secondary employer's premises
will be illegal secondary activity if it calls for action by the employees
of the secondary employer. 1 An important exception to this rule is
the "ally" doctrine, which has been read into the act in order to protect
12
only those secondary employers who are neutrals to the labor dispute.
This doctrine makes activity, which would otherwise be prohibited as
secondary, legal primary activity if the action is against an "ally" or
interested third party.1 3 The NLRB has applied this doctrine where
the ownership and control of both employers is in substantially the
same hands,14 but has been reluctant to extend it further. 15 The courts
which have considered the problem have been more willing to extend
the doctrine, holding that separate ownership and control are not
conclusive as to the neutrality of the secondary employer. 16 The relationship between the activities of the two employers has become the
test in determining if they are "allies." The fact that an employer who
is not a party to the dispute is doing work which would have been
done by the primary employer "but for" the strike has been held
to establish the alliance, 7 and the same result has been reached
where the activities of the two employers constituted one "straight10. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
11. This is the position taken by the NLRB. 15 NLRB AiN. REP. 139 (1950).
Where there is a "common situs" (the usual situation in the building construction industry), it is evident that the usual tests fail; the NLRB has, therefore, laid down four conditions, all of which must be met before the picketing
under such circumstances will be primary and permissible:
"(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of
picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the
situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute
is with the primary employers." Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547,
549 (1950).
12. This doctrine was established in the leading case of Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (usually referred
to as the Ebasco case).
13. Developments in the Law-The Taft-Hartley Act, 64 HARV. L. REV. 781,
802 (1951).
14. Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949) (the same individuals
owned each company and the officers of each were substantially the same;
the decision of the Board may also have been based on the fact that the two
employees were engaged in one "straight-line" operation).
15. The NLRB refused to apply the doctrine in Royal Typewriter Co., 111
N.L.R.B. 317 (1955), although the second circuit found that the primary employer was "farming out struck work" to the secondary employer. NLRB v.
Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1955).
16. Ibid.; Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672
(S.D.N.Y. 1948).
17. NLRB v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F.2d
553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1955); Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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line" operation.' 8 However, where the activities merely constitute the
doing of business 9 with the primary employer, the activity is not sufficient to establish an alliance.2 0
The court in the instant case emphasized that while common ownership and management may be factors to be considered in determining
the relationship of two employers, this alone is not sufficient to establish an alliance per se. The court, applying the test of activity, found
that the activities of the two employers pertained solely to ordinary
buying and selling, which is precisely what is protected by the act.
This decision seems to clarify some of the uncertainty surrounding
the law of secondary boycotts. Further, the application of the test
established in this case should establish some uniformity in the decisions of the NLRB and the courts. By establishing the rule that the
union must prove that a secondary employer's business activities are
closely connected with a primary employer, even though the two are
owned and controlled by the same persons, the decision effectuates the
purpose of the act-the protection of neutral third persons from harmful economic pressures. At the same time a union may continue to use
economic sanctions against an employer who is not a neutral to the
labor dispute.

REAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION BY HUSBAND
AND WIFE DOES NOT RIPEN INTO A TENANCY
BY THE ENTIRETY
Husband and wife moved onto a farm in 1910 and lived together
thereon in adverse possession until the husband's death in 1950. The
wife continued to live on the land until her death in 1954. Thereafter,
plaintiffs, collateral heirs of the husband, brought an action against
the collateral heirs of the wife to determine title to the land. The
Chancellor, granting a partition, held that adverse possession by
husband and wife for the statutory period created a tenancy in com18. A "straight-line" operation appears to be found where one employer
uses a second employer's activities and facilities as a necessary adjunct to the
completion of the total operation which the former undertook to perform; for
example, it has been found where a lumber company used a transportation
company to get the felled timber to the lumber company's sawmill. IrwinLyons Lumber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 54, 83 (1949). See note 14 supra.
19. The term "doing business" would ordinarily cover doing any business
which the secondary employer is free to discontinue regardless of whether
he is merely supplying materials to the employer, or has subcontracted with
him to perform part of a work which the employer has himself contracted to
do. International Brotherhood of Electric Workers v. NLRB, 181" F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
20. NLRB v. Wine, Liquor and Distillery Workers Union, 178 F.2d 584 (2d
Cir. 1949); Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 769 (1951).
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mon. Defendants appealed on the ground that a tenancy by the
entirety was created and upon the husband's death his widow became
the owner of the entire fee. Held, affirmed. Adverse possession by
husband and wife for the statutory period does not create a tenancy
by the entirety; such an estate cannot arise by operation of the statute
of limitations, but only from a devise, deed or other instrument.
Preston v. Smith, 293 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
Though abolished in more than half the states,' tenancies by the
entirety 2 are still recognized in Tennessee 3 and the common law rule
that a conveyance to a husband and wife creates a tenancy by the
entirety, absent an expressed intention to the contrary, is vigorously
applied.4 The courts of this state have also preserved the common law
rule that unity of time, title, interest and possession are essential to
the creation of such an estate. 5 In further deference to these estates
it has been held that the rights of a judgment creditor in property
held by the entirety are conditioned upon the survival of the debtorspouse.6 Thus, generally speaking, estates by the entirety enjoy very
favorable treatment in Tennessee, not only as to realty but also as to
7
personal property.
This court, confronted with a case of first impression, 8 refused to find
a tenancy by the entirety because of lack of "unity of title." They construed the common law on this point as requiring a tangible "deed,
conveyance or other instrument" 9 to satisfy this unity. The conclusion
was reached despite strong authority for the proposition that at common law a joint tenancy, which also requires unity of title,10 could
1. 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1806 n.58 (perm. ed. 1940).
2. "A tenancy by the entirety . . . is essentially a form of joint tenancy,
modified by the common-law theory that husband and wife are one person."
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 217 (3d ed. 1939). See also 4 THOMPSON, REAL
PROPERTY §§ 1803-26 (perm. ed. 1940); 26 AM. JuR., Husband and Wife § 66
(1940).
3. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark, 288 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954). For a
discussion of the "break" in estates by the entirety between 1913 and 1919, see
21 TENN. L. REV. 339 (1950).
4. Ballard v. Farley, 143 Tenn. 161, 226 S.W. 544 (1920); Bennett v. Hutchens,
133 Tenn. 65, 179 S.W. 629 (1915); Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31
S.W. 1000 (1895). But cf. Faulkner v. Ramsey, 178 Tenn. 370, 158 S.W.2d
710 (1942).
5. Holt v. Holt, 185 Tenn. 1, 202 S.W.2d 650 (1947). This rule has been somewhat relaxed by a statute which allows a tenancy by the entirety to arise
from an inter-spousal conveyance. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-109 (1956).
6. Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384 (1931); Cole Mfg.
Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895); Ames v. Norman, 36 Tenn.
683 (1857).
7. Campbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn. 77, 66 S.W.2d 990 (1934).
8. Although the case of Wilson v. Clark, 288 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1954), is similar to the instant case, the adverse possession in that case was
under color of a deed which could satisfy unity of title. No deed being present
in the instant case the court was forced to look elsewhere for that unity.
9. Instant case, 293 S.W.2d at 61.
10. See note 2 supra. See also 2 AmEarcA- LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6(a) at 25
(Casner ed. 1952).
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be created by joint adverse possession." The English case of Ward v.
Ward12 dealt specifically with the question of common title in such
a situation and held that since the possession of joint disseizors becomes wrongful at the same moment, they acquire title at the same
moment; therefore, they hold by one common right, or one common
wrongful title. Interestingly enough, the American Law of Property,
cited by the court in support of its holding on this point, uses language
in defining unity of title which is clearly contrary to the court's conclusion. 13 Had the court chosen to follow the common law on this
point it might have found a tenancy by the entirety without considering the defendants' argument regarding the presumption of a lost
14
grant.
This decision is not in harmony with the general attitude of the
courts in Tennessee toward tenancies by the entirety. It seems to be
based upon equitable considerations arising from the peculiar facts
involved here which called for a partition between these particular
litigants. Other circumstances are conceivable, however, in which survivorship would have yielded the most equitable result. Suppose, for
example, that the widow, still alive and residing on the premises had
been sued for a partition by the collateral heirs of the husband, and
suppose in this instance that the premises involved had consisted only
of a small house and lot. It would seem that under these conditions
the court would have felt compelled to find a tenancy by the entirety.
In view of the common law authority regarding the unity of title
requirement, and the popularity of tenancies by the entirety in Tennessee, it is surprising that the court would commit itself to the
broad rule laid down in this case.
11. "Littleton § 278, says, 'if two or three disseize another of any lands or
tenements to their own use, then the disseizors are joint tenants.' There may
be, therefore, a joint tenancy created by a disseizen, as well as by deeds or
devise." Putney v. Dresser, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 583, 586 (1839). "At common
law, if two or more persons disseise another to their own use, the disseisors
are joint tenants, and so it would seem that, at the present day, if two persons
acquire land by adverse possession, they hold as joint tenants .... ." 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 204 (3d ed. 1939). See also Fowler v. Thayer, 58 Mass. (4
Cush.) 111 (1849) (dictium); 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy § 3(a) (1947); 2 COKE
UPON LITTLETON § 180b (1853).
12. L.R. 6 Ch. App. 789 (1871).

13. "Unity of title meant that all must acquire title by the same deed or
will or by a joint adverse vossession." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1
at 5 (Casner ed. 1952). (Emphasis added.)
14. The common law presumption of a lost grant was originally an element
in the law regarding prescription of incorporeal interests in land. For a discussion of the manner in which this presumption became a part of the law
of adverse possession in Tennessee, see Shoffner, Title By Adverse Possession
In Tennessee, 5 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1952).
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TRADE REGULATION-VIOLATION OF "FAIR TRADE"
PRICE BY ISSUANCE OF TRADING STAMPS
Plaintiff manufacturer sought to enjoin defendant, a non-signer of a
fair trade agreement, from selling his product below the "fair traded"
price in violation of the Massachusetts Fair Trade Act.1 The defendant contended that failure to enforce the fair trade agreement
against retailers who violated it by the issuance of trading stamps
constituted a waiver of any right of action against him for selling
below the "fair trade" price. Held: the issuing of trading stamps
in conjunction with sale of fair trade items at the minimum price is
a violation of the Act; and the injunction will not be granted until
the manufacturer takes appropriate measures to prosecute these
violators. Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, Inc., 142
F. Supp. 545 (D. Mass. 1956).2
Fair trade laws, which are designed to give a trade-mark owner
the right to3 control the price of his product in order to protect his
"good will," have been enacted in forty-five states.4 In some twenty
states 5 the fair trade laws prohibit specified types of indirect, as well
as direct, price-cutting.6 The question of whether trading stamps constitute proscribed price cuts would not arise in these states because
the statutes enumerate the prohibited activities; all others being
1. "[K]nowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any [fair trade]
commodity at less than the price stipulated . . . whether the person so

advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract,
is hereby declared to constitute unfair competition
93, § 14B (1954).

....

"

MAss. Am.
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c.

The clause permitting enforcement against non-signers of the fair trade

agreement is included in all the fair trade laws of the several states. The
McGuire Act., 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1952), specifically confers on
the states a right to enforce such "non-signer clauses" on goods involved in
interstate commerce. However, some state courts have held these clauses
unconstitutional. See 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 3003 (1956) (table showing

holdings of the several states).
2. The injunction was granted by the court in a supplemental opinion, the
plaintiff having instituted actions against the issuers of trading stamps in
the state court. 142 F. Supp. at 550.
3. Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936); General
Electric Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 132 N.E.2d 652 (Mass. 1956). For a
discussion of whether or not this is the primary reason for the laws, see Rose,
Resale Price Maintenance, 3 VAlt. L. REV. 24 (1949).
4. 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 3003 (1956).
5. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 10000-15585 (1956) (giving text of fair trade

laws of each state).

6. "[E]xcept to the extent authorized by the contract:
(1) The offering or giving of any article of value in connection with the
sale of such commodity;
(2) The offering or the making of any concession of any kind, whether
by the giving of coupons or otherwise, in connection with any such
sale; or
(3) The sale or offering for sale of such commodity in combination with
any other commodityShall be deemed a violation of such resale price restriction .... " VM-N.
STAT. ANN. § 325.09 (1947).
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allowed by implication.7 In the other twenty-five states the fair trade
laws prohibit price-cutting generally, leaving it to the courts to determine whether an act or benefit other than a direct price cut violates the Act. This determination must be made when the dealer,
selling at the fair trade price, attempts to give something "extra"
as an inducement to either employees or customers. Such "extras"
include discounts to employees, 8 gifts,9 combination sales with another
article, 10 selling the trade-marked product in smaller quantity and for
a price less than that to which the manufacturer agrees, all of
which have been held to violate fair trade laws. On the other hand
customer services such as free extension of credit, nurseries, and
bus service seemingly do not constitute proscribed price cutting.' 2
Reasonable discount for cash sales has generally been regarded as
a reward for prompt payment and, as such, it is a separate transaction not involving the purchase price.13 The courts which have
considered the problem of indirect price cuts have developed no
clear test for determining whether an "extra" is a violation of the
fair trade act. Of the various tests which have been applied, 14 the
most important seems to be: Is the relationship between the "extra"
and the article close enough to consider it a reduction of the purchase
price? 15
The issuance of trading stamps has been allowed as an advertising
medium constituting no more than a discount for cash sales.16
7. But see Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margretts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d
310 (1954) (an act governing sale of motor fuel and prohibiting rebates, concessions or benefits given directly or indirectly to lower the price of the
fuel did not prohibit a reasonable discount for cash sales, including trading
stamps).
8. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Bamberger & Co., 122 N.J. Eq. 559, 195 Atl. 625
(Ch. 1937). But cf. General Electric Co. v. Monarch-Saphin Co., 80 N.Y.S.2d
419 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (discount to employees allowed where fair trade agreement so provides).
9. E. R. Squib & Sons v. Charline's Cut Rate, Inc., 9 N.J. Super. 328, 74 A.2d
354 (Ch. 1950) (gift of $2.50 cigarette lighter with each $2.00 purchase not
allowed).
10. Magazine Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbord, 125 N.J. Eq. 593, 7 A.2d
411 (Ch. 1939).

11. Gurloin, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 297 N.Y. 11, 74 N.E.2d 217,
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947).
12. Sunbeam Corp. v. Klien, CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1951 Trade Cas.) 1
62806 (Del. Ch. March 27, 1951).
13. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
Contra, Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950).
14. Other tests seem to be: Does the "extra" substantially injure the protected property-the trade mark? Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., supra
note 13; Does the "extra" have some individual significance of its own which
should be protected? Weco Products Co. v. Mid-city Cut Rate Drug Stores,
55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942).
15. Under even the strictest interpretation of the fair trade laws courts
agree that all "extras" which confer pecuniary benefits on the customer are
not price cuts. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177 (1950).
The test resolves itself into a question of what the court in the particular
jurisdiction finds is reasonable.
16. Weco Products Co. v. Mid-city Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App.
2d 684, 131 P.2d 856 (1942).
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One court, applying the legal maxim de minimus non curat Zex,
stated that even if the issuance of trading stamps was a violation
of the fair trade agreement, an injunction would not lie because the
injury was so slight. 17 Another court, under a similar statute, granted
the injunction holding that the stamps violated the act because they
were devices designed to advertise the seller and increase his volume
of sales. This court stated that to allow any discount would invite
a flood of cut-throat competition which the act was designed to prevent.18 The court in the instant case rejected the contention that
trading stamps were no more than a reasonable cash discount. The
customer earned the discount, approximately 2%% of the purchase
price, only by revisiting the store enough times to spend $120, the
amount necessary to obtain stamps to fill one book. "This is a direct
quantity discount, paid retroactively like a quota discount, even if
it may be said that it includes a discount for cash."'19 The court indicated, without deciding, that a reasonable discount for cash sales
might be lawful, indicating something less than 2% was reasonable. 20
It would seem that the fair trade acts were not designed to outlaw
all competition, but only the "vicious price-cutting" which injures
the manufacturers' property right. Contrary to the manufacturers'
contention, the court found that the stamps did injure his property
right. The instant case represents the first decision designating an
arbitrary figure as reasonable. If it is conceded that reasonableness
should be the test, it would seem that what is reasonable might be
better viewed in the light of damage to the protected property rather
than the amount of benefit to the customer.
17. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).

18. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177 (1950).
19. 142 F. Supp. at 549.

20. Expert testimony submitted in the instant case indicated that extending
credit cost a retailer well over 2% of the purchase price and since this cost

was absorbed by the retailer, it actually conferred a pecuniary benefit on the

customer equal to the cost of extending the credit. Hence, a retailer selling
at the minimum resale price and extending credit was actually selling the
article at approximately 4% less than the minimum resale price. The plaintiff contended that since this practice was not deemed price cutting, any
corresponding discount for cash sales not in excess of 4% should likewise
not be deemed price cutting. The court rejected this contention, distinguishing the extending of credit as a "normal credit arrangement." "I cannot believe that the legislature intended to strike down this department store type
of transaction." 142 F. Supp. at 548.

